












evidence.	 However,	 particularly	 since	 the	 terror	 attacks	 of	 11	 September	 2001,	
governments	 in	 liberal	 democratic	 societies	 have	 increased	 secrecy	 and	 the	 use	 of	
clandestine	 procedures	 under	 the	 pretext	 of	 safeguarding	 national	 security.	 In	 many	
instances,	 these	 developments	 have	 eroded	 civil	 liberties,	 infringed	 upon	 constitutional	
guarantees,	and	had	negative	effects	on	due	process	rights.	In	Australia,	where	individual	
rights	and	freedoms	have	only	limited	constitutional	expression,	it	is	hoped	the	doctrine	of	
representative	 and	 responsible	 government	 will	 act	 as	 sufficient	 protection	 for	 human	
rights.	Conversely,	drawing	on	examples	ranging	from	the	regulation	of	immigration	to	the	
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Notwithstanding	situations	where	 legal	secrecy	 is	required	or	seen	as	positive,	secrecy	 in	 law	









for	 the	mere	articulation	of	 ideas’	 (Reilly	 and	La	Forgia	2013:	144).	 Indeed,	 although	 secrecy	
seems	incompatible	with	the	idea	of	democracy,	Darius	Rejali	(2007)	argues	democracies	move	





Typically,	however,	 legal	secrecy	is	seen	as	negative	because	it	 is	considered	an	affront	 to	the	
separation	of	powers,	due	process,	and	the	rule	of	law,	which,	in	turn,	impacts	adversely	on	open	
justice,	 procedural	 fairness	 and	 human	 rights.	 Ultimately,	 it	 is	 argued,	 secrecy	 stands	 in	
opposition	 to	 the	values	 that	apparently	underpin	 societies	 that	are	otherwise	open,	 free	and	
democratic.	 Especially	 since	 the	 terror	 attacks	 of	 11	 September	 2001,	 commentators	 have	
observed	a	steady	‘creep’	of	secrecy	in	western	democracies,	noting	‘it	is	generally	accepted	that	





the	 western	 world	 since	 2001,	 politicians	 remain	 adamant	 such	 measures	 are	 necessary	 to	
protect	national	security,	even	though	they	encroach	upon	individual	rights	and	civil	liberties.	In	
this	 context,	 too,	 keeping	certain	 information	 secret	has	 come	 to	be	 regarded	as	necessary	 to	
preserve	 intelligence	 sharing	 arrangements	 and	 diplomatic	 relations	 between	 nation‐states.	
Under	the	‘control	principle’,	intelligence	belonging	to	a	foreign	government	may	not	be	disclosed	
without	 that	 government’s	permission.	This	 is	one	of	 the	 reasons	 the	British	government,	 for	
example,	has	been	 resistant	 to	disclosing	 sensitive	material	 from	other	 countries,	 such	 as	 the	
United	States	(US),	in	court	cases	involving	allegations	of	rendition	and	mistreatment	in	the	‘war	
on	 terror’	 (Martin	 2014a:	 532;	 Scott	 Bray	 and	 Martin	 2012:	 126).	 These	 claims	 also	 inform	











6)—to	 include	 ‘the	 distortion	 and	 subversion	 of	 the	 public	 realm	 in	 the	 service	 of	 private	
interests’	 (Beetham	2015:	42).	 In	 recent	 times,	 this	has	been	no	better	 illustrated	 than	 in	 the	
financial	crisis	of	2008	where,	as	Colin	Crouch	(2016)	says,	 ‘the	financial	 institutions	that	had	
created	 the	 crisis	were	 able	 to	 influence	public	policy	 in	 a	way	 that	protected	 their	 interests,	
pushing	the	burden	on	to	the	general	public	who	had	been	their	victims	and	who	had	to	bail	out	
the	banks	with	public	spending	cuts’.	Crouch	(2016)	has	talked	about	the	bank	bailout	and	other	
forms	of	 corruption	 in	 the	 context	 of	what	he	 terms	 ‘post‐democracy’,	which	he	defines	 as	 ‘a	
situation	where	all	the	institutions	of	democracy—elections,	changes	of	government,	free	debate,	
rule	of	 law—continue,	but	 they	become	a	charade,	because	democratic	 institutions	have	been	
surpassed	as	major	decision‐making	entities	by	small	groups	of	financial	and	political	elites’.	
	












Hence,	we	 observe	 the	 contradictory	 nature	 of	 democratic	 rights	 under	 neoliberalism,	which	













idea	 that	 the	 activities	of	 government	 should	 serve	 a	 general	or	public	 interest	



















laws	 in	 respect	 of	 contentious	 issues.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 suggested	 attention	 should	 probably	 turn	 to	
questions	about	the	need	for	a	statutory	human	rights	instrument	or	bill	of	rights	in	Australia.	








other	 legal	 instrument	 guaranteeing	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 (Charlesworth	 et	 al.	 2003:	 424).	
Moreover,	 the	 Australian	 Constitution	 (the	 Constitution)	 provides	 only	 limited	 protection	 for	




nature	 and	 scope	 of	 rights	 and	 freedoms.	 For	 instance,	 in	 Australian	 Capital	 Territory	 v	
Commonwealth,	 the	High	Court	invalidated	Part	IIID	of	the	Broadcasting	Act	1942	(Cth),	which	
banned	political	advertising	during	elections	and	strictly	regulated	it	at	other	times.	The	Court	












terror	 attacks	 of	 11	 September	 2001	 as	 a	 watershed	 moment	 in	 lawmaking	 insofar	 as	 ‘past	
conventions	 and	practices	 that	 lead	parliamentarians	 to	 exercise	 self‐restraint	with	 regard	 to	
democratic	 principles	 were	 put	 aside	 in	 the	 name	 of	 responding	 to	 the	 threat	 of	 terrorism’	
(Williams	2015).	
	
In	Australia,	prominent	 legal	scholar,	George	Williams,	has	 identified	350	 instances	of	current	
Commonwealth,	 state	 and	 territory	 laws	 that	 infringe	 democratic	 rights	 and	 freedoms,	 209	
(approximately	 60	 per	 cent)	 of	 which	 have	 been	 introduced	 since	 September	 2001.	 Federal	
legislation	and	laws	enacted	by	New	South	Wales	and	Queensland	parliaments	encroach	the	most	





































trigger	 for	operation	of	 the	VLAD	 [Vicious	Lawless	Association	Disestablishment]	










that	 the	 idea	 of	 representativeness	 is	 something	 of	 a	 misnomer	 given:	 (a)	 Queensland’s	
unicameral	 system	 (that	 is,	 no	 upper	 house	 to	 act	 as	 a	 check	 on	 power	 exercised	 by	 the	





the	 idea	 of	 responsible	 government	 should	 also	 not	 apply	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Queensland,	 which	
highlights	 the	 dangers	 of	 ‘overcriminalisation’	 whereby	 there	 is	 ‘an	 increased	 recourse	 to	












(iii)	 the	 control	 of	 serious	 organised	 crime.	 First,	 infringements	 on	 press	 freedom	 have	 been	
introduced	 pursuant	 to	 amendments	 made	 in	 2014	 to	 the	 Australian	 Security	 Intelligence	
Organisation	Act	1979	(Cth),	which	prohibits	media	reporting	of	‘special	intelligence	operations’	
and	 anything	 that	 ‘relates	 to’	 them.	Williams	 (2015)	 argues	 the	 effect	 of	 this	 provision	 is	 to	
criminalise	reporting	that	may	be	in	 the	public	 interest,	since	 it	could	reveal	 incompetence	or	
wrongdoing	on	 the	part	 of	 the	authorities.	Moreover,	 similar	 offences	 exist	 for	other	 types	of	
secret	information,	such	as	when	information	of	a	controlled	operation	is	revealed.	
	
Freedom	 of	 the	 press	 has	 been	 limited	 further	 by	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Telecommunications	
(Interception	 and	 Access)	 Amendment	 (Data	 Retention)	 Act	 2015	 (Cth),	 which	 provides	 the	
executive	 with	 new	 powers	 to	 apply	 for	 ‘journalist	 information	 warrants’	 that	 can	 compel	




of	 “identification,	 and	 if	 appropriate,	 prosecution”	 of	 the	 persons	 responsible	 for	 leaking	 the	
information’	(Williams	2015).	
	







sexual	 abuse	 and	 self‐harm,	 in	 offshore	 detention	 centres	 in	 Nauru	 (Editorial	 Board	 2015).	
Alternatively,	it	has	been	argued,	leaked	stories	are	useful	to	the	authorities	because	they	act	as	









Force	 officials	would	be	 patrolling	 the	 centre	 of	Melbourne,	 randomly	 stopping	 and	 checking	
peoples’	visa	conditions.	As	with	similar	counterterrorism	initiatives,	Operation	Fortitude,	as	it	
was	named,	was	introduced	on	the	basis	of	ensuring	community	safety,	and	it	also	involved	the	
cooperation	 of	 police.	 These	 developments	 represent	 the	 continuation	 of	 a	 process	 of	
militarisation	of	the	Department	of	Immigration,	and	its	greater	reliance	on	secrecy	(McKenzie‐
Murray	2015),	which	are	also	features	of	changes	police	forces	have	undergone	in	recent	times,	
and	particularly	 since	September	2001	 (Martin	2011).	Dehumanising	asylum	seekers	 is	a	key	
government	strategy	here	too,	as	indicated	by	restrictions	placed	on	media	reporting	of	asylum	


























secretive	 screening	 processes	 that	 have	 been	 used	 in	 Australia	 since	 27	 October	 2012	 are	
contrary	 to	 notions	 of	 democratic	 deliberation,	which	 require	 issues	 be	discussed	 publicly	 to	









contradictory	 nature	 of	 contemporary	 Australian	 democracy.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 secrecy	
surrounding	immigration	policy	in	Australia,	and,	in	particular,	provisions	of	the	Border	Force	Act	








measures	 introduced	 after	 September	 2001	 have	 gradually	 crept	 into	 other	 areas	 of	 law	 and	
policy	beyond	the	counterterrorism	context	(Martin	2012:	191,	209).	Williams	(2015)	too	talks	






Another	 area	 of	 law	 and	 government	 policy	 that	 has	 been	 affected	 by	 seepage	 from	 the	
counterterrorism	 context	 is	 the	 control	 of	 serious	 organised	 crime	 allegedly	 committed	 by	














of	Australia	held	 that	 s	41(1)	of	 the	Serious	and	Organised	Crime	 (Control)	Act	2008	 (SA)	was	
invalid	 ‘because	 it	 authorised	 the	 Executive	 to	 enlist	 the	Magistrates	 Court	 to	 implement	 the	









to	 ‘criminal	 intelligence’	 relied	 upon	 to	 declare	 a	 ‘criminal	 organisation’	 do	 not	 impair	 the	
essential	and	defining	characteristics	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Queensland	so	as	to	transgress	the	














turn,	 upon	 democratic	 principles;	 that	 is	 because	 both	 courts	 and	 parliaments	 have	 some	










According	 to	 these	 arguments,	 the	 use	 of	 criminal	 intelligence	 provided	 for	 under	 control	 of	






to	 a	 situation	 in	which	 the	 target	 ‘has	 at	 least	 some	 shadowy	 sense’	 they	 are	not	 privy	 to	 all	
information	(Scheppele	1988:	76).	Although	Scheppele’s	analysis	does	not	extend	to	state	secrets	
and,	therefore,	the	impact	of	such	secrecy	on	democratic	values	per	se,	this	aspect	of	secrecy	is	




obstacles	 to	 public	 scrutiny	 because	 they	 are	 utterly	 hidden	 from	 citizens,	 whereas	 shallow	
secrets	 at	 least	 allow	 citizens	 the	 ability	 to	 respond	 to	 and	 challenge	 secret‐keepers’	 (Martin	




impair	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 individual	 to	 exercise	meaningful	 choice,	 undermining	






courts	 is	 probably	 more	 akin	 to	 a	 deep	 secret	 than	 a	 shallow	 secret,	 ‘because	 even	 though	
respondents	know	a	clandestine	process	is	at	work	(i.e.,	a	special	closed	hearing	to	determine	an	
application	to	declare	criminal	 intelligence),	since	they	and	their	representatives	are	excluded	




curial	 settings.	 Similar	 criticisms	of	 secret	procedures	have	been	made	 in	English	 court	 cases	
involving	allegations	of	torture	at	‘dark	sites’	like	Guantanamo	Bay.	For	instance,	in	Mohamed	(No	
2),	United	Kingdom	(UK)	Foreign	 Secretary,	David	Miliband,	made	a	public	 interest	 immunity	
application	 on	 the	 basis	 disclosure	 of	 government	 documents	 and	 information,	 which	 had	


















adjudicate	 on	 certain	matters	 of	 due	process,	 rather	 than	upholding	 established	principles	 of	
procedural	fairness.	Arguably,	that	need	is	all	the	more	pressing	in	an	era	when	politicians	tend	
increasingly	 to	depart	 from	the	principles	of	 restraint	and	responsible	government	 in	making	
policy	and	legislating	on	populist	‘law	and	order’	issues.	
	
In	 lieu	 of	 a	 federal	 bill	 of	 rights,	 the	 Australian	 government	 has	 enacted	 the	 Human	 Rights	
(Parliamentary	Scrutiny)	Act	2011	(Cth),	although,	according	to	Williams	(2015),	 there	 is	 little	
evidence	 that	 has	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 in	 preventing	 or	 dissuading	 parliaments	 from	


















a	 statutory	 bill	 of	 rights	 might	 have	 on	 the	 judicial	 interpretation	 of	 rights‐infringing	
counterterrorism	 legislation.	He	 shows	how,	 on	 questions	 of	 deprivation	 of	 liberty	which	 are	
thrown	up	when	 applications	 for	 control	 orders	 are	made,	UK	 courts	have	 consistently	 given	
substantial	weight	to	notions	of	 liberty	under	Article	5	of	the	ECHR,	 implemented	through	the	
Human	Rights	Act	1998	(UK).	Accordingly,	they	have	concluded	there	are	no	bright	lines	between	





of	 ‘an	 increasingly	 doubtful	 belief	 that	 informal	 human	 rights	 mechanisms	 (such	 as	 trust	 in	
government,	procedural	fairness	and	an	independent	judiciary)	are	sufficient	to	protect	citizens	








Indeed,	 the	 reticence	of	UK	courts	 to	challenge	 the	broad	drafting	of	anti‐terror	 legislation	or	
determine	that	punishment	is	a	purpose	of	the	control	orders	regime	may	suggest	there	would	
be	 little	point	 introducing	 legislation	 similar	 to	 the	UK	Human	Rights	Act	 in	Australia.	 In	 that	
respect,	Ewing	and	Tham	(2008)	have	commented	on	the	futility	of	the	UK	Act,	observing	that	
British	 courts	 largely	 remain	 deferential	 to	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 parliament,	 and	 display	 only	 a	
diluted	 commitment	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 which	means	 they	 have	 had	 a	 correspondingly	weak	











a	 significant	 challenge	 to	 the	 (unwritten)	 British	 constitution,	 civil	 liberties,	 and	 due	 process	
rights,	including	rights	to	minimum	disclosure	in	closed	proceedings	(Martin	2014a;	Martin	and	
Scott	Bray	2013;	Martin,	Scott	Bray	and	Kumar	2015).	And,	in	other	jurisdictions	where	formal	
provision	 is	 made	 for	 human	 rights	 in	 statutes	 or	 other	 legal	 instruments,	 the	 events	 of	 11	




governments	 to	 observe	 human	 rights	 norms.	 Hence,	 notwithstanding	 protections	 afforded	
Canadian	citizens	under	the	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms,	research	in	that	country	has	shown	
how	contemporary	protest	policing	methods,	for	example,	have	involved	‘the	systematic	violation	







US	Constitution,	 ‘right	of	 the	people	 to	be	secure	 in	 their	persons,	houses,	papers,	 and	effects,	
against	unreasonable	searches	and	seizures’,	contrary	to	the	protection	of	basic	rights.	In	the	case	
of	 Atwater	 v	 City	 of	 Lago	 Vista,	 for	 instance,	 ‘the	 majority	 five	 determined	 that	 the	 arrest,	
handcuffing	and	detention	in	cells	of	the	appellant	while	being	charged	with	the	misdemeanour	























authorise	 entry	 to	 a	 subject	 premises	without	 the	 occupier’s	 knowledge	 (Martin	 2010:	 164).	
Police	use	of	surveillance	techniques	such	as	this,	as	well	as	other	secret	procedures,	means	their	
powers	are	increasingly	reminiscent	of	those	formerly	reserved	for	agents	working	within	the	
security	 intelligence	 community.	 Moreover,	 the	 New	 South	 Wales	 government	 recently	
introduced	 measures	 aimed	 at	 ‘criminalising	 dissent’	 (Martin	 2017),	 subjecting	 anti‐mining	







such	 as	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 counterterrorism,	 organised	 crime,	 and	 immigration	 and	 border	














the	substance	or	 ‘gist’	of	allegations	made	against	 them	so	as	 to	enable	 them	to	give	effective	
instruction	 to	 challenge	 those	 allegations	 (see	 Martin	 2014a).	 However,	 these	 measures	 are	
themselves	contentious	and	subject	to	debate	regarding	the	de	facto	procedural	protection	they	
afford	persons	accused	of	criminal	activity.	Problems	with	special	advocates	include	that	they	‘are	
gravely	 hampered	 by	 the	 rules	 which	 severely	 restrict	 communications	 between	 the	 special	
advocate	 and	 the	 party	 they	 “represent”	 once	 the	 closed	material	 has	 been	 served’	 (Tomkins	









may	 limit	 political	 participation	 to	 periodic	 voting	 in	 elections—producing	 citizens	 who	 are	
‘reduced	 to	 the	 role	 of	 manipulated,	 passive,	 rare	 participants’	 (Crouch	 2004:	 21)—recent	
populist	uprisings	in	the	US	(the	election	of	Trump)	and	the	UK	(Brexit)	demonstrate	that	should	
not	be	taken‐for‐granted.	 Indeed,	 these	events	signal	not	only	 the	widespread	disillusionment	
with	a	corrupt	political	elite,	but	could	also	herald	‘the	removal	of	some	fundamental	supports	of	
democracy	and	therefore	a	parabolic	return	to	some	elements	characteristic	of	pre‐democracy’	
(Crouch	 2004:	 22).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 present	 discussion,	 one	 substantive	 consequence	
mentioned	by	Crouch	(2004:	23)	is	a	return	to	prominence	of	the	state’s	role	as	policeman	and	
incarcerator,	which	has	certainly	escalated	since	September	2001,	and	seems	likely	to	continue	








Correspondence:	 Dr	 Greg	 Martin,	 Associate	 Professor	 of	 Socio‐Legal	 Studies	 and	 Chair	 of	



















6	 See	 ‘California	 moves	 to	 protect	 citizens’	 right	 to	 record,	 photo	 police’	 (8	 April	 2015).	 Available	 at	
www.rt.com/usa/247981‐california‐recording‐cops‐reprisal‐protections/	(accessed	10	October	2016).	
7	 See	 ‘Arizona	 lawmaker	 introduces	bill	 to	criminalize	 filming	police	at	 close	 range’	 (11	 January	2016).	
Available	at	www.rt.com/usa/328547‐arizona‐police‐filming‐bill/	(accessed	10	October	2016).	
8	In	a	letter	to	Bishop	Mandell	Creighton,	5	April,	1887,	Lord	Action	commented:	'Power	tends	to	corrupt,	
and	absolute	power	corrupts	absolutely'	(Dalberg‐Acton	1887	[1907]:	504).	
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